API endpoints - QWED Documentation

Base URL

https://api.qwedai.com/v1

Health check

GET /health

Check API status. No authentication required.

curl https://api.qwedai.com/v1/health

Response:

{
  "status": "healthy",
  "service": "QWED Platform",
  "version": "5.1.0",
  "timestamp": "2024-12-20T12:00:00Z"
}

GET /health/identity

Challenge-response proof that the server holds a given secret set. qwed init calls this endpoint before bootstrapping an API key to confirm it’s talking to the right local server. See qwed init. No authentication required. Query parameters:

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`nonce`	string	Yes	Caller-generated random value, 1–128 characters. Use a fresh nonce for every request.

# Fresh random value per request, e.g. Python's secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
curl http://localhost:8000/health/identity?nonce=Vh8Qm2xT-0pLw6KdYs3rZbNf_5JtAe1X

Response:

{
  "identity": {
    "jwt_hmac": "9f2c...e41a",
    "lookup_hmac": "b07d...5c13"
  }
}

Field	Description
`identity.jwt_hmac`	Hex HMAC-SHA256 under `QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY` of the message `qwed-server-identity-v1:jwt:<nonce>`
`identity.lookup_hmac`	Hex HMAC-SHA256 under `QWED_API_KEY_LOOKUP_SECRET` of the message `qwed-server-identity-v1:lookup:<nonce>`

To verify, compute the same HMACs with your local secrets and compare them in constant time. The secrets themselves are never returned. Error responses:

Status	Detail	Cause
`400`	`nonce is required (max 128 characters)`	`nonce` is missing, empty, or longer than 128 characters
`503`	`server secrets not configured`	The server has no `QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY` or `QWED_API_KEY_LOOKUP_SECRET` set

Servers released before this endpoint existed return 404.

Request limits

Every /verify route enforces a request body cap. QWED rejects an oversized body before the handler reads or parses it.

Route	Body cap
JSON routes: `/verify/natural_language`, `/verify/logic`, `/verify/fact`, `/verify/code`, `/verify/math`, `/verify/sql`, `/verify/rag`, `/verify/process`, `/verify/consensus`, `/verify/batch`	1,000,000 bytes
`/verify/stats` (multipart upload)	10,000,000-byte file plus 64 KiB envelope headroom
`/verify/image` (multipart upload)	10 MiB file plus 64 KiB envelope headroom

The server also bounds slow work so one request can’t stall the API for other callers. Self-hosters can tune these bounds with environment variables. See Availability limits.

Status	Detail	Cause
`408`	`Request body not received in time.`	The client didn’t finish sending the body within the read deadline (10 seconds for JSON routes, 30 seconds for uploads)
`413`	`Request body exceeds the <N> byte limit for this endpoint.`	The body is larger than the route’s cap
`503`	`Server busy — retry shortly.`	Too many JSON requests are in flight on this server process
`503`	`Upload capacity reached — retry shortly.`	Too many `/verify/stats` or `/verify/image` uploads are in flight on this server process

Treat 503 responses from these limits as retryable. Back off and resend the request.

Verification endpoints

POST /verify/natural_language

Main entry point for verifying natural language queries. Routes through the QWED Control Plane with multi-tenancy support. Request:

{
  "query": "What is 15% of 200?",
  "provider": "openai"
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`query`	string	Yes	Natural language claim to verify
`provider`	string	No	Preferred LLM provider (e.g., `openai`, `anthropic`)

Response: The response follows the VerificationResult schema. For math queries, the top-level status is INCONCLUSIVE because the LLM translation step is not formally verified — see Trust boundary for details.

{
  "status": "INCONCLUSIVE",
  "user_query": "What is 15% of 200?",
  "translation": {
    "expression": "0.15 * 200",
    "claimed_answer": 30.0,
    "reasoning": "15% as decimal is 0.15, multiply by 200",
    "confidence": 0.95
  },
  "verification": {
    "calculated_value": 30.0,
    "is_correct": true,
    "diff": 0.0
  },
  "trust_boundary": {
    "query_interpretation_source": "llm_translation",
    "query_semantics_verified": false,
    "verification_scope": "translated_expression_only",
    "deterministic_expression_evaluation": true,
    "formal_proof": false,
    "translation_claim_self_consistent": true,
    "provider_used": "openai_compat",
    "overall_status": "INCONCLUSIVE"
  },
  "final_answer": 30.0,
  "provider_used": "openai_compat",
  "latency_ms": 245.3
}

Status values for natural language math verification:

Status	Meaning
`INCONCLUSIVE`	Expression evaluation succeeded, but the LLM translation step is non-deterministic, so you cannot treat the result as a proven verdict on the original user query
`ERROR`	The translated expression had a syntax error or the engine could not evaluate it
`NOT_MATH_QUERY`	The query was not recognized as a mathematical question
`BLOCKED`	Request blocked by security policy

Previous versions set the status field to the inner engine result (e.g., VERIFIED). It now returns INCONCLUSIVE when the inner engine returns VERIFIED or CORRECTION_NEEDED, because the natural language pipeline involves a non-deterministic LLM translation step. Use the trust_boundary object to inspect the detailed verification breakdown. For fully deterministic results, use POST /verify/math directly.

trust_boundary fields:

Field	Type	Description
`query_interpretation_source`	string	Always `"llm_translation"`
`query_semantics_verified`	boolean	Always `false` — QWED cannot verify that the LLM correctly interpreted the user’s intent
`verification_scope`	string	Always `"translated_expression_only"` — the attestation and enforcement below bind to the translated expression, not the natural-language `user_query`
`deterministic_expression_evaluation`	boolean	`true` when the inner engine status was `VERIFIED` or `CORRECTION_NEEDED`
`formal_proof`	boolean	Always `false`
`translation_claim_self_consistent`	boolean	Whether the translated expression matched its own claimed answer
`provider_used`	string	LLM provider used for translation
`trust_enforced`	string	Status returned by the mandatory trust-boundary enforcement step. Matches `overall_status`.
`attestation_policy`	string	Always `"mandatory"` — attestation admission is always required, never advisory
`attestation_error`	string	Present only when the underlying attestation failed to sign. Machine-readable code (e.g. `SIGNING_FAILURE`, `CRYPTO_UNAVAILABLE`) explaining why the response was downgraded to `BLOCKED`.
`overall_status`	string	Final status set from the enforced decision — never from the raw verifier verdict. Mirrors the top-level `status` field.

Mandatory attestation admission

The control plane treats attestation as an admission gate, not a decoration:

The final status and trust_boundary.overall_status are set by enforce_trust_decision(..., require_attestation=True) after signing, not by the raw verifier verdict. A VERIFIED math result is only surfaced once create_verification_attestation() returns ISSUED.
If attestation signing fails for any reason, the response is downgraded to BLOCKED (fail-closed). The attestation error code is echoed under trust_boundary.attestation_error and the top-level response omits the attestation token.
The attestation qwed.query_hash binds to the translated expression that the deterministic engine actually evaluated — not to the natural-language user_query. This matches the disclosed verification_scope: "translated_expression_only": the natural-language query still appears in response.user_query for display, but downstream consumers verifying the attestation should hash the translated expression, not the user prose.

See Cryptographic attestations for the full AttestationResult contract and Trust boundary for the math-engine discussion.

The LLM provider call runs off the server’s event loop under QWED_PROVIDER_TIMEOUT (default 30 seconds). If the provider doesn’t respond in time, the request fails closed with an ERROR status instead of stalling other requests.

POST /verify/math

Updated in v5.1.0: verify_identity() numerical sampling fallback now returns BLOCKED with is_equivalent: false instead of UNKNOWN. This fail-closed behavior ensures that sampling-only agreement is never mistaken for a verified identity.

Verify mathematical expressions or equations using SymPy symbolic computation. Request:

{
  "expression": "x**2 + 2*x + 1 = (x+1)**2",
  "context": {
    "domain": "real"
  }
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`expression`	string	Yes	Mathematical expression or equation. Use `=` for equations
`context`	object	No	Optional context (e.g., `{"domain": "real"}` to restrict to real numbers)

Response (equation):

{
  "is_valid": true,
  "result": true,
  "left_side": "x**2 + 2*x + 1",
  "right_side": "(x + 1)**2",
  "simplified_difference": "0",
  "message": "Identity is true"
}

Response (expression):

{
  "is_valid": true,
  "value": 4.0,
  "simplified": "4",
  "original": "2 + 2"
}

Symbolic expressions that cannot be evaluated to a numeric value include is_symbolic: true. Expressions involving complex numbers include is_complex: true. Ambiguous expressions: Expressions with implicit multiplication after division (e.g., 1/2(3+1)) are rejected with is_valid: false, result: false, and status: "BLOCKED". The response includes warning: "ambiguous" and a message explaining why. Rewrite the expression with explicit parentheses or a * operator to remove the ambiguity.

{
  "is_valid": false,
  "result": false,
  "status": "BLOCKED",
  "warning": "ambiguous",
  "message": "Expression may be ambiguous due to implicit multiplication after division",
  "simplified": "..."
}

Error cases: Division by zero, log(0), and square root of negative numbers in the real domain return is_valid: false with a descriptive error and message. Tolerance bounding: When verifying an expression against an expected value with a tolerance parameter, the engine enforces a deterministic upper bound on the tolerance. The maximum allowed tolerance is max(0.01, abs(calculated_value) * 0.01). If the requested tolerance exceeds this bound, the request returns a BLOCKED status. Invalid tolerance values (negative, NaN, Infinity, or non-numeric) are also rejected with BLOCKED. Response (tolerance exceeded):

{
  "is_correct": false,
  "error": "Tolerance exceeds deterministic verification bound",
  "requested_tolerance": "1000",
  "max_allowed_tolerance": "0.02000000",
  "calculated_value": "2.000000",
  "precision_mode": "decimal",
  "status": "BLOCKED"
}

Field	Type	Description
`requested_tolerance`	string	The tolerance value that was submitted
`max_allowed_tolerance`	string	The maximum tolerance the engine allows for the computed result
`calculated_value`	string	The engine’s computed result
`precision_mode`	string	`"decimal"` or `"float"` depending on the computation path

POST /verify/logic

Verify logical constraints. Routes through the QWED Control Plane. Request:

{
  "query": "(AND (GT x 5) (LT y 10))",
  "provider": "openai"
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`query`	string	Yes	Logical constraint in DSL or natural language
`provider`	string	No	Preferred LLM provider

Response:

{
  "status": "SAT",
  "model": {"x": "6", "y": "9"},
  "provider_used": "openai_compat"
}

The provider_used field indicates which LLM provider handled the translation step. This field is included in both success and error responses, which helps with debugging provider routing issues.

Status	Meaning
`SAT`	Satisfiable — a solution exists
`UNSAT`	Unsatisfiable — no solution possible
`BLOCKED`	Request blocked by security policy (returns HTTP 403)
`ERROR`	Internal verification error

Error response:

{
  "status": "ERROR",
  "error": "Internal verification error",
  "provider_used": "openai_compat"
}

The provider translation step runs under QWED_PROVIDER_TIMEOUT (default 30 seconds) and the Z3 solve under QWED_Z3_TIMEOUT (default 15 seconds). A timeout returns the ERROR response above.

POST /verify/code

Updated in v7.0.0 (breaking)

Check code for security vulnerabilities using AST analysis. Returns the unified DiagnosticResult shape plus a separate admission decision. Request:

{
  "code": "import os\nos.system('rm -rf /')",
  "language": "python"
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`code`	string	Yes	Source code to analyze
`language`	string	No	Programming language (default: `python`)

Response (unsafe code — proven unsafe, not admitted):

{
  "status": "VERIFIED",
  "agent_message": "The code failed security verification and is not safe to use.",
  "developer_fields": {
    "constraint_id": "code_verifier.code_unsafe",
    "is_safe": false,
    "is_valid": false,
    "language": "python",
    "critical_count": 1,
    "issues": [
      {
        "severity": "CRITICAL",
        "type": "os.system",
        "line_number": 2,
        "description": "Shell command execution"
      }
    ]
  },
  "proof_ref": "sha256:...",
  "is_authoritative": true,
  "admission": "BLOCKED"
}

Field	Type	Description
`status`	string	`VERIFIED` when the scan completed (safe or unsafe code); `BLOCKED` when verification itself failed (empty code, unsupported language, internal error)
`admission`	string	`ADMIT` or `BLOCKED` — the fail-closed admission decision. `ADMIT` only when `status` is `VERIFIED` and `developer_fields.is_valid` is `true`
`developer_fields.is_valid`	boolean	The safety gate — `true` only when no critical issue was found
`developer_fields.issues`	array	Detected vulnerabilities with severity, type, line number, and description
`proof_ref`	string	Present on `VERIFIED` results (including verified-unsafe); `null` on `BLOCKED`

Breaking change (v7.0.0): proven-unsafe code now returns HTTP 200 with status: "VERIFIED" (previously BLOCKED). VERIFIED answers “was the code checked?”, not “is it safe to execute?”. Consumers that gated on status for safety must switch to the admission field or developer_fields.is_valid.

Status	Description
503	`Code verification timed out.` The scan exceeded `QWED_CODE_VERIFY_TIMEOUT` (default 10 seconds)

POST /verify/sql

Updated in v7.0.0 (breaking)

Validate SQL queries against a provided schema. Returns the unified DiagnosticResult shape plus a separate admission decision. Request:

{
  "query": "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = 1",
  "schema_ddl": "CREATE TABLE users (id INT, name TEXT)",
  "dialect": "sqlite"
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`query`	string	Yes	SQL query to validate
`schema_ddl`	string	Yes	DDL schema definition (e.g., `CREATE TABLE` statements)
`dialect`	string	No	SQL dialect (default: `sqlite`)

Response (safe query):

{
  "status": "VERIFIED",
  "agent_message": "The SQL query passed verification and is safe to execute.",
  "developer_fields": {
    "constraint_id": "sql_verifier.sql_valid",
    "is_valid": true,
    "malicious_classification": false
  },
  "proof_ref": "sha256:...",
  "is_authoritative": true,
  "admission": "ADMIT"
}

A proven-malicious query returns status: "VERIFIED" with developer_fields.is_valid: false, developer_fields.malicious_classification: true, and admission: "BLOCKED" — proving malice is a successful proof, so the truth verdict is preserved while admission is denied. BLOCKED status is reserved for verification failures: sql_verifier.parse_error, sql_verifier.schema_parse_error, sql_verifier.complexity_limit_exceeded, and sql_verifier.execution_error. See the SQL engine page for the full contract.

POST /verify/fact

Verify a factual claim against a provided context. Request:

{
  "claim": "Paris is the capital of France",
  "context": "France is a country in Western Europe. Its capital is Paris.",
  "provider": "anthropic"
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`claim`	string	Yes	The factual statement to verify
`context`	string	Yes	Reference text to verify the claim against
`provider`	string	No	Preferred LLM provider

Response:

{
  "verdict": "SUPPORTED",
  "confidence": 0.98,
  "reasoning": "The context explicitly states that the capital of France is Paris"
}

Verdict	Meaning
`SUPPORTED`	Claim is supported by the context
`REFUTED`	Claim contradicts the context
`INCONCLUSIVE`	Not enough evidence in the context

Status	Description
503	`Fact verification timed out.` The provider call exceeded `QWED_PROVIDER_TIMEOUT` (default 30 seconds)

POST /verify/consensus

New in v4.0.0 · Updated in v5.0.0

Multi-engine consensus verification. Runs the query through multiple verification engines and requires agreement above a confidence threshold. This endpoint is rate-limited per API key. Mathematical expressions are parsed and compared using Decimal arithmetic internally, which avoids floating-point drift when engines cross-check results.

The fact engine is excluded from automatic engine selection during consensus verification. Fact-based verification requires external context and will return an error if invoked without it, preventing self-referential consensus loops.

Request:

{
  "query": "The square root of 144 is 12",
  "verification_mode": "high",
  "min_confidence": 0.95
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Default	Description
`query`	string	Yes	—	The claim to verify
`verification_mode`	string	No	`single`	`single`, `high`, or `maximum`
`min_confidence`	float	No	`0.95`	Minimum confidence threshold, 0–1

Verification modes:

Mode	Engines	Use case
`single`	1	Fast, single engine verification
`high`	2	Higher confidence for important claims
`maximum`	3+	Critical domains (medical, financial)

Response:

{
  "final_answer": "12",
  "confidence": 98.5,
  "engines_used": 2,
  "agreement_status": "UNANIMOUS",
  "verification_chain": [
    {
      "engine": "math",
      "method": "symbolic",
      "result": "12",
      "confidence": 99.0,
      "latency_ms": 12.5,
      "success": true,
      "status": "VERIFIED"
    }
  ],
  "total_latency_ms": 45.2,
  "meets_requirement": true
}

Field	Type	Description
`confidence`	float	Confidence as a percentage (0–100)
`verification_chain`	array	Detailed results from each engine
`verification_chain[].status`	string	Trust-boundary status from that engine — `VERIFIED`, `UNVERIFIABLE`, or `BLOCKED`
`meets_requirement`	boolean	True only when consensus is `VERIFIED` at the trust boundary and `confidence` meets `min_confidence`. Confidence alone is never sufficient.

Only unanimous VERIFIED engine outcomes can produce a VERIFIED consensus. Advisory-only sub-engines (statistical computation, code execution) always return UNVERIFIABLE, so a query answered solely by those paths never satisfies meets_requirement. See the Consensus engine page for the full sub-engine contract.

Status	Description
400	Invalid verification mode
422	Consensus confidence below the requested `min_confidence` threshold
503	Secure Docker sandbox unavailable — required for Python engine in `high`/`maximum` mode

Each server process runs at most QWED_SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT sandbox containers at once (default 4). If a Python engine run can’t get a sandbox slot within QWED_SANDBOX_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT (default 10 seconds), QWED rejects the run with Sandbox capacity reached — retry shortly. instead of starting another container. A capacity rejection never produces a VERIFIED result.

POST /verify/image

Verify claims about image content. Accepts multipart form data with an image file (max 10 MB). Supported formats: PNG, JPEG, GIF, WebP. Request:

curl -X POST https://api.qwedai.com/v1/verify/image \
  -H "X-API-Key: qwed_your_key" \
  -F "image=@photo.jpg" \
  -F "claim=The image is 800x600 pixels"

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`image`	file	Yes	Image file (max 10 MB; PNG, JPEG, GIF, WebP)
`claim`	string	Yes	The claim about the image to verify

Response:

{
  "verdict": "SUPPORTED",
  "confidence": 0.95,
  "reasoning": "Image dimensions match the claimed resolution",
  "methods_used": ["metadata_analysis", "pixel_inspection"]
}

Verdict	Meaning
`SUPPORTED`	Claim is confirmed by image analysis
`REFUTED`	Claim contradicts image analysis
`INCONCLUSIVE`	Cannot determine from available methods
`VLM_REQUIRED`	Visual Language Model needed for deeper analysis

POST /verify/stats

Verify statistical claims against CSV data. Accepts multipart form data with a CSV file. Statistical code execution requires the secure Docker sandbox. If Docker is unavailable, the endpoint returns HTTP 503. If the verification is blocked by a security policy, it returns HTTP 403. Request:

curl -X POST https://api.qwedai.com/v1/verify/stats \
  -H "X-API-Key: qwed_your_key" \
  -F "file=@data.csv" \
  -F "query=The average salary is above 50000"

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`file`	file	Yes	CSV data file
`query`	string	Yes	Statistical claim to verify

Response (execution succeeded):

{
  "status": "UNVERIFIABLE",
  "agent_message": "Statistical analysis completed, but the claim could not be deterministically verified.",
  "developer_fields": {
    "constraint_id": "stats_verifier.claim_not_verified",
    "is_valid": false,
    "observed_result": 52340.5,
    "columns": ["salary"],
    "dataset_sha256": "9f2c...",
    "sandbox_type": "docker",
    "execution_time_ms": 412.7
  },
  "proof_ref": null,
  "is_authoritative": false
}

Breaking change (v7.0.0): the endpoint returns the unified DiagnosticResult shape instead of the legacy {"status": "SUCCESS" | "ERROR" | "BLOCKED", "result": ..., "code": ...} shape. Successful execution now reports status: "UNVERIFIABLE" with the observed value in developer_fields.observed_result — execution success alone is never presented as a proven claim, so VERIFIED is not emitted from this endpoint.

Failure states return status: "BLOCKED" with a constraint_id of stats_verifier.validation_error (translation or security validation failed), stats_verifier.execution_failure (sandbox execution failed), or stats_verifier.runtime_unavailable (Docker unavailable). Blocked results carry no proof_ref.

Status	Description
403	Verification blocked by security policy (e.g., generated code failed AST safety checks)
503	Secure Docker sandbox unavailable — statistical verification requires Docker

Statistical verification requires a running Docker daemon. If Docker is unavailable, the endpoint returns HTTP 503 instead of falling back to in-process execution. See the Stats engine page for details.When the sandbox is at capacity (QWED_SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT containers already running) and no slot frees within QWED_SANDBOX_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT, the execution is rejected with Sandbox capacity reached — retry shortly. and the result is BLOCKED.

POST /verify/process

New in v4.0.1

Verify the structural integrity of LLM reasoning traces. Supports IRAC structural compliance checking and custom milestone validation with decimal scoring. Request (IRAC mode):

{
  "trace": "The issue is whether the contract was breached. The rule is Article 2 of the UCC. Applying this rule, the defendant failed to deliver on time. In conclusion, breach occurred.",
  "mode": "irac"
}

Request (milestones mode):

{
  "trace": "Risk assessment complete. Compliance check passed. Implementation timeline defined.",
  "mode": "milestones",
  "milestones": ["risk assessment", "compliance check", "implementation"]
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Default	Description
`trace`	string	Yes	—	The LLM reasoning trace to validate
`mode`	string	No	`irac`	`irac` or `milestones`
`milestones`	string[]	Conditional	—	Required when `mode` is `milestones`

Response (IRAC mode):

{
  "verified": true,
  "score": 1.0,
  "missing_steps": [],
  "mechanism": "Regex Pattern Matching (Deterministic)"
}

Response (milestones mode):

{
  "verified": true,
  "process_rate": 1.0,
  "missed_milestones": []
}

Status	Description
400	Invalid mode or missing `milestones` when `mode` is `milestones`

POST /verify/rag

New in v4.0.1

Verify that retrieved RAG chunks originate from the expected source document. Prevents Document-Level Retrieval Mismatch (DRM) hallucinations in RAG pipelines. Request:

{
  "target_document_id": "contract_nda_v2",
  "chunks": [
    { "id": "c1", "metadata": { "document_id": "contract_nda_v2" } },
    { "id": "c2", "metadata": { "document_id": "contract_nda_v1" } }
  ],
  "max_drm_rate": "0"
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Default	Description
`target_document_id`	string	Yes	—	Expected source document ID
`chunks`	object[]	Yes	—	Array of chunk objects with metadata
`max_drm_rate`	string	No	`"0"`	Maximum tolerable mismatch fraction as a `Fraction`-compatible string (e.g. `"0"`, `"1/10"`)

max_drm_rate accepts only string values for symbolic precision. Use fraction notation like "1/10" instead of 0.1.

Response:

{
  "verified": false,
  "risk": "DOCUMENT_RETRIEVAL_MISMATCH",
  "drm_rate": 0.5,
  "chunks_checked": 2,
  "mismatched_count": 1
}

Status	Description
400	Invalid request payload (empty `target_document_id`, empty `chunks`, or invalid `max_drm_rate` value)

POST /verify/batch

Verify multiple items in a single request. Processes all items concurrently and returns aggregated results. Maximum 100 items per batch. Request:

{
  "items": [
    {"query": "What is 2+2?", "type": "natural_language"},
    {"query": "(AND (GT x 5) (LT y 10))", "type": "logic"},
    {"query": "x**2 + 2*x + 1 = (x+1)**2", "type": "math"}
  ]
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`items`	array	Yes	Array of verification items (max 100)
`items[].query`	string	Yes	The claim to verify
`items[].type`	string	No	Verification type: `natural_language`, `logic`, `math`, `code`, `fact`, `sql` (default: `natural_language`)
`items[].params`	object	No	Additional parameters for the verification

Response: Each entry in items is a per-item response. For math items the verdict is the DiagnosticResult record nested under the item’s result — the same three-layer verdict shape used by POST /verify/math — so batch and single-item math verifications share one contract:

result.status — VERIFIED, UNVERIFIABLE, or BLOCKED.
result.agent_message — short human-readable summary safe to surface to the caller.
result.developer_fields — engine detail (including the legacy is_valid flag for backward compatibility).
result.proof_ref — cryptographic hash of the retained proof artifact. Present only when result.status == VERIFIED; null otherwise. This is the authority bit — downstream gates must reject any item whose proof_ref is null.

{
  "job_id": "batch_abc123",
  "status": "completed",
  "progress_percent": 100.0,
  "total_items": 2,
  "completed_items": 2,
  "failed_items": 0,
  "items": [
    {
      "id": "batch_abc123-0",
      "query": "x**2 + 2*x + 1 = (x+1)**2",
      "type": "math",
      "status": "completed",
      "result": {
        "status": "VERIFIED",
        "agent_message": "Identity verified",
        "developer_fields": {
          "query": "x**2 + 2*x + 1 = (x+1)**2",
          "type": "math",
          "is_valid": true,
          "diff": "0"
        },
        "proof_ref": "sha256:9f2c…",
        "is_authoritative": true
      },
      "latency_ms": 12.3
    },
    {
      "id": "batch_abc123-1",
      "query": "x + x",
      "type": "math",
      "status": "completed",
      "result": {
        "status": "UNVERIFIABLE",
        "agent_message": "Expression simplified, but no equality or proof claim was provided",
        "developer_fields": {
          "query": "x + x",
          "type": "math",
          "is_valid": false,
          "simplified": "2*x"
        },
        "proof_ref": null,
        "is_authoritative": false
      },
      "latency_ms": 8.1
    }
  ]
}

Math items: proof vs. simplification

Math items are routed through the trust boundary (enforce_trust_decision(require_attestation=True) on VERIFIED, with a signed attestation issued via create_verification_attestation). Three outcomes are possible:

Result	`status`	`proof_ref`	When
Verified identity	`VERIFIED`	`sha256:...`	Equality claim (e.g., `x*2 + 2x + 1 = (x+1)2`) simplifies to `0` and** attestation signing succeeds.
Not equal	`UNVERIFIABLE`	`null`	Equality claim where the two sides do not simplify to the same expression. `developer_fields.is_valid` is `false` and `developer_fields.diff` shows the non-zero difference.
Simplification only	`UNVERIFIABLE`	`null`	Expression without an equality (e.g., `x + x`). `developer_fields.simplified` contains the simplified form.

If attestation signing fails on an otherwise-verified identity, the item is downgraded to UNVERIFIABLE with developer_fields.constraint_id = "api.attestation.signing_error" — a math result is never returned as VERIFIED without a signed proof.

Bare expressions (no =) always return UNVERIFIABLE. A successful symbolic simplification is not a verified claim. To get a VERIFIED outcome from a math item, submit an equality (e.g., x + x = 2*x).

The pre-v6.0 top-level is_valid field is preserved inside developer_fields.is_valid for backward compatibility, but new code should gate on result.status == "VERIFIED" and the presence of result.proof_ref. The batch response does not include a pass/fail aggregate because a boolean cannot represent the three-status verdict — count items[].result.status == "VERIFIED" entries directly if you need a success ratio.

Each item runs under QWED_BATCH_ITEM_TIMEOUT (default 60 seconds). An item that times out is marked failed with its error recorded, and the rest of the job still completes.

Status	Description
400	No items, or more than 100 items
503	`Batch capacity reached — retry shortly.` The job store is full of active jobs. See Availability limits

GET /verify/batch/

Get the status and results of a batch verification job. Use this to poll results when processing large batches. Response:

{
  "job_id": "batch_abc123",
  "status": "completed",
  "items": [...]
}

Status	Description
403	Access denied — job belongs to a different organization
404	Job not found

Verification Context endpoints

New in v7.1.0

These endpoints work with Verification Context v1.0 documents — the standardized JSON record of a verification. All three require an API key and are rate-limited per key.

POST /verification-context/from-diagnostic

Convert a DiagnosticResult into a schema-valid Verification Context document. Use this when you have an engine verdict and need the standardized VC record for auditing or downstream gating. Request:

{
  "query": "x**2 + 2*x + 1 = (x+1)**2",
  "verifier": "MathVerifier",
  "diagnostic": {
    "status": "VERIFIED",
    "agent_message": "Identity verified",
    "developer_fields": {"is_valid": true},
    "proof_ref": "sha256:9f2c…"
  },
  "verifier_version": "7.1.0",
  "attestation_token": "<ES256 JWT attestation>"
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`query`	string	Yes	The formal statement that was verified
`verifier`	string	Yes	Name of the engine that produced the diagnostic
`diagnostic`	object	Yes	The `DiagnosticResult` record (`status` / `agent_message` / `developer_fields` / `proof_ref`)
`verifier_version`	string	No	Engine version. Defaults to the installed `qwed` package version
`attestation_token`	string	No	Signed attestation for the diagnostic. Required to keep a `VERIFIED` status

Response: the full Verification Context document (spec_version, object, context, verdict). Fail-closed behavior:

A malformed diagnostic payload is converted to a BLOCKED document instead of being rejected, so the audit trail records the failure.
A VERIFIED diagnostic without an attestation_token fails closed to BLOCKED (trust_gate.mandatory_attestation_missing). A supplied invalid token fails closed to BLOCKED (trust_gate.invalid_attestation_token); a valid token with mismatched claims uses the corresponding trust_gate.claims_* code. Attestation is enforced through the same trust boundary as /verify/*.

Status	Description
422	The resulting document failed Verification Context validation
500	Audit persistence failed

POST /verification-context/validate

Validate a Verification Context document against the v1.0 JSON Schema, including the verdict/proof_ref invariants. Request:

{
  "document": {
    "spec_version": "1.0",
    "object": {"formal_statement": "x**2 + 2*x + 1 = (x+1)**2"},
    "context": {
      "interpretation": {"theory": "real-closed field", "logic": "first-order logic"},
      "proof": {"verifier": "qwed", "verifier_version": "7.1.0"},
      "evidence": {"evidence": {"status": "VERIFIED"}, "proof_ref": "sha256:9f2c…"},
      "decision": {"admission": "ADMIT"}
    },
    "verdict": "VERIFIED"
  }
}

Response:

{"valid": true}

An invalid document returns {"valid": false, "error": "validation_failed"} with HTTP 200. Gate on the valid field.

POST /verification-context/resolve

Resolve the proof_ref evidence commitment of a Verification Context document. The server removes the stored proof_ref, re-derives the SHA-256 commitment over the canonical (RFC 8785) bound payload, and compares it to the stored value. Request:

{
  "document": {
    "spec_version": "1.0",
    "object": {"formal_statement": "x**2 + 2*x + 1 = (x+1)**2"},
    "context": {
      "interpretation": {"theory": "real-closed field", "logic": "first-order logic"},
      "proof": {"verifier": "qwed", "verifier_version": "7.1.0"},
      "evidence": {"evidence": {"status": "VERIFIED"}, "proof_ref": "sha256:9f2c…"},
      "decision": {"admission": "ADMIT"}
    },
    "verdict": "VERIFIED"
  }
}

Response:

{"resolved": true}

resolved is true only when the document has verdict: "VERIFIED", validates against the schema, and the stored proof_ref matches the re-derived commitment. Any other outcome (non-VERIFIED verdict, schema failure, mismatched or missing commitment) returns {"resolved": false} — a proof_ref that cannot be resolved confers no authority.

Agent endpoints

POST /agents/register

{
  "name": "FinanceBot",
  "agent_type": "semi_autonomous",
  "description": "Financial analysis agent",
  "permissions": ["math", "logic", "code"],
  "max_cost_per_day": 50.0
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Default	Description
`name`	string	Yes	—	Agent display name
`agent_type`	string	No	`autonomous`	`autonomous`, `semi_autonomous`, or `assistant`
`description`	string	No	—	Agent description
`permissions`	array	No	`[]`	Allowed verification engine names (e.g., `math`, `logic`, `code`)
`max_cost_per_day`	float	No	`100.0`	Daily budget cap in USD

Agent types:

Type	Description
`autonomous`	Fully autonomous agent (AutoGPT-style)
`semi_autonomous`	Requires approval for critical actions
`assistant`	Human-in-the-loop

Response:

{
  "agent_id": 42,
  "agent_token": "qwed_agent_...",
  "name": "FinanceBot",
  "type": "semi_autonomous",
  "status": "active",
  "max_cost_per_day": 50.0,
  "message": "Agent registered successfully. Store the agent_token securely."
}

Store the agent_token immediately — it cannot be retrieved again after registration.

POST /agents//verify

Updated in v5.0.0

Verify a claim using an agent token. Creates an auditable record tied to the agent. Security checks are enforced server-side — exfiltration detection always runs, and MCP poisoning detection runs automatically when a tool_schema is provided.

Breaking change (v5.0.0): The security_checks request field has been removed. Security checks are now mandatory and enforced server-side. You no longer need to (or can) opt in to exfiltration or MCP poison checks.

Breaking change (v5.0.0): The context field with conversation_id and step_number is now required for all agent action verification requests. Requests without these fields are rejected with error code QWED-AGENT-CTX-001. See conversation controls for details.

Request:

{
  "query": "What is 15% of 200?",
  "provider": "openai",
  "context": {
    "conversation_id": "conv_abc123",
    "step_number": 1,
    "pre_action_state_hash": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855",
    "state_source": "db_snapshot"
  },
  "tool_schema": {
    "name": "fetch_report",
    "description": "Fetch quarterly report data"
  }
}

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
`query`	string	Yes	The claim to verify
`provider`	string	No	LLM provider preference
`context`	object	Yes	Action context — see below
`context.conversation_id`	string	Yes	Unique identifier for the conversation/session
`context.step_number`	integer	Yes	Monotonically increasing step counter (>= 1)
`context.pre_action_state_hash`	string	Conditional	SHA-256 hex digest (64 lowercase hex characters) of the world state before the action. Must be provided together with `state_source`. Enables LOOP-004 detection
`context.state_source`	string	Conditional	Declares how `pre_action_state_hash` was derived. One of: `file_tree`, `db_snapshot`, `conversation_digest`, `git_tree`, `custom`. Must be provided together with `pre_action_state_hash`
`tool_schema`	object	No	MCP tool definition to scan. When provided, `MCPPoisonGuard` runs automatically

Headers:

X-Agent-Token: qwed_agent_...

Security behavior:

Exfiltration check: Always runs on every agent verification request. If the query payload is flagged, the request is rejected with a 403.
MCP poison check: Runs automatically when tool_schema is present. If the tool definition is flagged, the request is rejected with a 403.

Error responses:

Status	Description
401	Invalid agent token
403	Agent budget exceeded or request blocked by security checks
500	Internal agent verification error

POST /agents//tools/

Submit an agent tool call for risk evaluation before execution. Unknown tools (not on the safe or dangerous operations list) are denied by default, regardless of risk score. See tool approval policy for details. Request:

{
  "tool_params": {
    "query": "SELECT * FROM users",
    "dialect": "postgresql"
  }
}

Possible outcomes:

Outcome	When
Approved	Tool is on the safe operations list
Blocked (manual approval required)	Tool is on the dangerous operations list
Blocked (default-deny)	Tool is not on either list

GET /agents//activity

Retrieve the audit log for a specific agent. Provides a full audit trail of all agent actions. Headers:

X-Agent-Token: qwed_agent_...

Query params:

Parameter	Type	Default	Description
`limit`	integer	`20`	Maximum number of activity records to return

Response:

{
  "agent_id": 42,
  "agent_name": "FinanceBot",
  "total_activities": 5,
  "current_cost_today": 0.05,
  "max_cost_per_day": 50.0,
  "activities": [
    {
      "type": "verification_request",
      "description": "Query: What is 15% of 200?",
      "status": "success",
      "cost": 0.01,
      "timestamp": "2026-03-20T12:00:00Z"
    }
  ]
}

Status	Description
401	Invalid agent token

Attestation endpoints

GET /attestation/

Get an attestation by ID.

POST /attestation/verify

Verify an attestation JWT. Request:

{
  "jwt": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs..."
}

Observability endpoints

GET /metrics

Returns global system metrics and per-tenant breakdowns. This is a cross-tenant, platform-operator capability: the caller must be a user ID listed in QWED_METRICS_OPERATOR_USER_IDS (comma-separated, fail-closed when unset). Organization roles (owner / admin) do not grant access — they are scoped to a single organization. Headers (one of):

Authorization: Bearer <jwt_token>
X-API-Key: <api_key>

An API key resolves through its owning user, so the key must belong to an active user on the allowlist. Expired or revoked keys are not usable credentials; if a request carries both an API key and a JWT, the JWT can still authorize the read. Response:

{
  "global": { "total_requests": 1250, "avg_latency_ms": 82.3 },
  "tenants": { "1": { "requests": 500 }, "2": { "requests": 750 } }
}

Status	Description
401	No usable authentication provided (no credentials, or only an expired API key)
403	Authenticated, but the user is not in `QWED_METRICS_OPERATOR_USER_IDS`

GET /metrics/

Returns metrics scoped to a specific organization. Tenants can only view their own metrics.

Status	Description
403	You can only view metrics for your own organization

GET /metrics/prometheus

Returns metrics in Prometheus text format for scraping by monitoring infrastructure. Requires the same platform-operator authentication as GET /metrics. Headers (one of):

Authorization: Bearer <jwt_token>
X-API-Key: <api_key>

Status	Description
401	No usable authentication provided (no credentials, or only an expired API key)
403	Authenticated, but the user is not in `QWED_METRICS_OPERATOR_USER_IDS`

GET /logs

Returns verification logs for the authenticated tenant, ordered by most recent first. Query params:

Parameter	Type	Default	Description
`limit`	integer	`10`	Maximum number of logs to return

Response:

{
  "organization_id": 1,
  "organization_name": "Acme Corp",
  "total_logs": 3,
  "logs": [
    {
      "id": 42,
      "query": "What is 2+2?",
      "is_verified": true,
      "domain": "MATH",
      "timestamp": "2026-03-20T12:00:00Z"
    }
  ]
}

Admin endpoints

New in v4.0.0

Admin endpoints authenticate your API key with the X-API-Key header, then authorize the request by the role of the user who owns the key. Every admin endpoint acts only on your own organization, which is the organization the API key belongs to. Before QWED checks the role, the request must meet all of these conditions. Otherwise QWED returns 403 Forbidden:

The API key is active, not revoked, and not expired.
The key’s owning user is active and belongs to the key’s organization.
The organization is active.

Endpoint	Allowed roles	Another organization’s ID
`GET /admin/compliance/export/csv`	`owner`, `admin`	`403 Forbidden`
`GET /admin/compliance/verify/{log_id}`	`owner`, `admin`	`404 Not Found`
`GET /admin/compliance/report/soc2/{org_id}`	`owner`, `admin`	`403 Forbidden`
`GET /admin/security/threats/{org_id}`	`owner`, `admin`	`403 Forbidden`
`POST /admin/keys/rotate`	`owner`, `admin`, `member`	`404 Not Found`

A caller whose role isn’t allowed gets 403 Forbidden with "Insufficient permissions for this operation". A missing or invalid API key returns 401 Unauthorized.

Before this change, every admin endpoint returned 401 Unauthorized, even for valid owner and admin keys. Admin endpoints now authorize by role and are scoped to the caller’s organization.

GET /admin/compliance/export/csv

Export your organization’s audit trail as a CSV file (text/csv).

Parameter	Type	Description
`organization_id`	integer (query)	Must be your own organization ID

Passing another organization’s ID returns 403 Forbidden with "Cannot access another organization's data".

curl --fail-with-body -H "X-API-Key: qwed_live_your_admin_key" \
  "https://api.qwedai.com/v1/admin/compliance/export/csv?organization_id=12"

GET /admin/compliance/verify/

Cryptographically verify a specific audit log entry using HMAC-SHA256 and hash-chain validation. The entry must belong to your organization. QWED returns 404 Not Found for a log ID in another organization, so the response doesn’t reveal whether that entry exists. The response reports three independent checks: payload hash, HMAC signature (compared in constant time), and chain linkage to the prior entry within the same organization. Genesis entries must have a null previous_hash; non-genesis entries must link to a non-empty prior entry hash. Entries with malformed stored result payloads cause verification to fail closed with SecurityError instead of returning "valid": true. Hash matching accepts either the current canonical payload (which includes raw_llm_output) or the legacy canonical payload, so entries written before that field was covered remain verifiable after the upgrade. Response:

{
  "valid": true,
  "checks": {
    "hash_valid": true,
    "signature_valid": true,
    "chain_valid": true
  },
  "errors": [],
  "log_id": 42,
  "timestamp": "2026-03-20T12:00:00Z"
}

AuditLogger requires QWED_AUDIT_SECRET_KEY to be set. If the key is missing or persisted chain continuity cannot be loaded, initialization raises SecurityError and verification endpoints fail closed.

GET /admin/compliance/report/soc2/

Generate a SOC 2 Type II compliance report for your organization. org_id must be your own organization ID. Another organization’s ID returns 403 Forbidden.

GET /admin/security/threats/

Returns a real-time threat summary for your organization, including blocked injection attempts and anomalous patterns. org_id must be your own organization ID. Another organization’s ID returns 403 Forbidden.

POST /admin/keys/rotate

Rotate an API key and return the new secret once. Owners, admins, and members can call this endpoint, subject to these rules:

Your own key: any allowed role can rotate a key it owns.
Another user’s key: only an owner or admin can rotate it, and only when the key’s owner doesn’t hold a higher role. An admin can’t rotate an owner’s key. A member can’t rotate anyone else’s key. These cases return 403 Forbidden.
Organization scope: the key must belong to your organization. A key ID in another organization returns 404 Not Found, without revealing that the key exists.
Live keys only: QWED treats a revoked or inactive key as absent and returns 404 Not Found. You can’t rotate a dead credential into a new working secret.

Parameter	Type	Description
`key_id`	integer (query)	ID of the key to rotate

curl --fail-with-body -X POST -H "X-API-Key: qwed_live_your_key" \
  "https://api.qwedai.com/v1/admin/keys/rotate?key_id=42"

Response:

{
  "status": "rotated",
  "old_key_id": 42,
  "new_key_id": 57,
  "new_key_preview": "qwed_live_ab...",
  "new_key_secret": "qwed_live_..."
}

Store new_key_secret immediately. QWED returns it only in this response.

Badge endpoints

All badge endpoints return SVG images (image/svg+xml). You can embed them directly in Markdown or HTML.

GET /badge/verified

Get a verified or failed badge SVG.

Parameter	Type	Default	Description
`verified`	boolean	`true`	Whether to show a verified or failed badge

GET /badge/status/

Get a badge for any verification status (e.g., VERIFIED, FAILED, CORRECTED, BLOCKED, PENDING, ERROR).

GET /badge/attestation/

Get a badge for a specific attestation by ID.

GET /badge/engine/

Get a badge for a specific verification engine.

Parameter	Type	Default	Description
`verified`	boolean	`true`	Whether to show a verified or failed badge

GET /badge/custom

Generate a custom badge with configurable label, message, color, and logo.

Parameter	Type	Default	Description
`label`	string	`QWED`	Left side label
`message`	string	`verified`	Right side message
`color`	string	—	Hex color (e.g., `#00C853`)
`logo`	boolean	`true`	Include QWED logo

Webhook endpoints

POST /webhooks/secret-scanning

Receive signed secret-leak notifications from GitHub secret scanning (or any GitHub-compatible partner scanner). The endpoint is the intake side of the leaked-QWED-key revocation pipeline: authenticated reports of leaked tokens are handed to the revocation sink after signature verification succeeds. The endpoint is intentionally unauthenticated — it must be reachable by external scanners that have no QWED credentials. The ECDSA signature over the raw request body is the only credential; nothing in the payload is parsed, logged, or persisted until the signature is verified against GitHub’s published public keys. Request headers:

Header	Required	Description
`Github-Public-Key-Identifier`	Yes	Key identifier (`key_identifier`) of the signing key from `https://api.github.com/meta/public_keys/secret_scanning`
`Github-Public-Key-Signature`	Yes	Base64-encoded ASN.1/DER ECDSA-NIST-P256V1-SHA256 signature over the raw request body

Request body: A non-empty JSON array of match objects. Extra fields on each item are ignored so scanners can add informational fields over time.

[
  {
    "token": "qwed_live_KEY",
    "type": "qwed_live_api_key",
    "url": "https://github.com/acme-corp/billing-api/blob/main/config.py",
    "source": "commit"
  }
]

Field	Type	Required	Description
`token`	string	Yes	The leaked token (1–512 characters). Never logged.
`type`	string	Yes	Scanner-declared token type (1–128 characters)
`url`	string	No	Location where the token was found (max 4096 characters)
`source`	string	No	Scanner-declared source (max 64 characters). Defaults to `"unknown"`

Envelope caps:

Request body: 1 MiB. The stream is bounded incrementally — an over-cap body is rejected the moment the cap is exceeded and never fully buffered.
Matches per request: 500.
Signature header: 1024 characters before base64 decode.

Response (200):

{"received": 3}

A 200 acknowledges a verified receipt, not that downstream revocation has finished. Verified matches are handed to a background sink after the response is sent. Background handling of verified matches:

Active key: revoked immediately (is_active=False, revoked_at set). QWED writes a SECRET_LEAK_AUTO_REVOKED security event that carries only the key_preview, never the token.
Owner email: sent to the key’s user, or to the organization’s first active owner or admin as a fallback. SMTP has a 10-second timeout. A failed notification never rolls back the revocation.
Already-revoked key or unknown token: no revocation or owner notification. Redeliveries are idempotent and never send a second email. When false-positive feedback is enabled (next bullet), QWED still reports a label for the match — for an unknown token, false_positive.
Test keys: registered scanner patterns cover qwed_live_ keys only, so qwed_test_ keys are not reported. The revocation sink itself does not filter by prefix.
False-positive feedback (opt-in): when QWED_LEAK_FEEDBACK_ENABLED=true, QWED sends a true_positive or false_positive label per match to QWED_LEAK_FEEDBACK_URL after the revocation attempt. Items carry SHA-256 token hashes unless QWED_LEAK_FEEDBACK_SEND_RAW=true is set with an HTTPS URL.

See Automatic revocation of leaked keys and False-positive feedback reporter for details. Status codes:

Status	Meaning
200	Signature verified; matches queued for background handling
400	Malformed envelope (non-JSON body, wrong shape, or a match object failed validation)
401	Missing `Github-Public-Key-Identifier` or `Github-Public-Key-Signature` header
403	Signature invalid, forged, tampered, or signed by an unknown key against a fresh trust anchor
413	Body exceeds 1 MiB or the batch exceeds 500 matches
503	Signing-key service unavailable, or the key that signed the request cannot be resolved after a rotation retry — the scanner should redeliver

All signature-failure responses share a single generic detail ("invalid webhook signature") so the failing verification step is not observable to the caller.

Configure your scanner (or a GitHub partner-program registration) to POST to https://<your-qwed-host>/webhooks/secret-scanning. No API key or bearer token is provisioned on QWED’s side — the signature over the raw body is the sole credential, and QWED fetches the public keys from GitHub on demand. See Security hardening — Secret-scanning webhook intake for the trust model and operator configuration.

​Base URL

​Health check

​GET /health

​GET /health/identity

​Request limits

​Verification endpoints

​POST /verify/natural_language

​Mandatory attestation admission

​POST /verify/math

​POST /verify/logic

​POST /verify/code

​POST /verify/sql

​POST /verify/fact

​POST /verify/consensus

​POST /verify/image

​POST /verify/stats

​POST /verify/process

​POST /verify/rag

​POST /verify/batch

​Math items: proof vs. simplification

​GET /verify/batch/

​Verification Context endpoints

​POST /verification-context/from-diagnostic

​POST /verification-context/validate

​POST /verification-context/resolve

​Agent endpoints

​POST /agents/register

​POST /agents//verify

​POST /agents//tools/

​GET /agents//activity

​Attestation endpoints

​GET /attestation/

​POST /attestation/verify

​Observability endpoints

​GET /metrics

​GET /metrics/

​GET /metrics/prometheus

​GET /logs

​Admin endpoints

​GET /admin/compliance/export/csv

​GET /admin/compliance/verify/

​GET /admin/compliance/report/soc2/

​GET /admin/security/threats/

​POST /admin/keys/rotate

​Badge endpoints

​GET /badge/verified

​GET /badge/status/

​GET /badge/attestation/

​GET /badge/engine/

​GET /badge/custom

​Webhook endpoints

​POST /webhooks/secret-scanning

Base URL

Health check

GET /health

GET /health/identity

Request limits

Verification endpoints

POST /verify/natural_language

Mandatory attestation admission

POST /verify/math

POST /verify/logic

POST /verify/code

POST /verify/sql

POST /verify/fact

POST /verify/consensus

POST /verify/image

POST /verify/stats

POST /verify/process

POST /verify/rag

POST /verify/batch

Math items: proof vs. simplification

GET /verify/batch/

Verification Context endpoints

POST /verification-context/from-diagnostic

POST /verification-context/validate

POST /verification-context/resolve

Agent endpoints

POST /agents/register

POST /agents//verify

POST /agents//tools/

GET /agents//activity

Attestation endpoints

GET /attestation/

POST /attestation/verify

Observability endpoints

GET /metrics

GET /metrics/

GET /metrics/prometheus

GET /logs

Admin endpoints

GET /admin/compliance/export/csv

GET /admin/compliance/verify/

GET /admin/compliance/report/soc2/

GET /admin/security/threats/

POST /admin/keys/rotate

Badge endpoints

GET /badge/verified

GET /badge/status/

GET /badge/attestation/

GET /badge/engine/

GET /badge/custom

Webhook endpoints

POST /webhooks/secret-scanning